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Abstract. The ISO/IEC committee in charge of standardizing the well-known 
MPEG audiovisual standards has launched, in cooperation with the ISO committee 
on Biotechnology, a new activity for efficient compressed storage and 
transmission of genomic information. The paper presents proposals for adding 
privacy and security to such in-progress standards. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, there is an increasing amount of genomic information being generated for 
different purposes: research, genetic analysis, precision medicine, search of relatives, 
forensics, etc. This means that the information generated will probably need to be 
stored, transferred and, ideally, protected against attacks.  
On the one hand, several attacks have already been identified, usually to find out if 
an individual’s genome is inside a set of genomes [1], but also to infer regions of the 
genome which have to remain private [2]. 
On the other hand, there is an initiative of the Moving Picture Experts Group 
(MPEG) Standardization Committee [3] for the representation of genomic information 
in a compressed way, including security and privacy aspects.  
The authors have presented several proposals (such as [4]) as answer to the MPEG 
Committee call for proposals [5], but we concentrate on the one that includes the 
provision of security and privacy mechanisms to support the storage and transmission 
of genomic information.  
In the next sections, we describe the MPEG Committee activities on genomic 
information, our proposal for security and privacy and some conclusions and future 
work. 
2. Methods: The Moving Pictures Experts Group (MPEG) Work on Genomics 
The Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) [3] is a working group of ISO/IEC 
(ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 29/WG 11). Since 1988, the group has produced standards for 
coded representation of digital audio and video and related data. 
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Based on their successful previous experience in audiovisual content compression, 
a new initiative inside MPEG to provide compression mechanisms for genomic 
information was started two years ago. After a detailed process of obtaining 
requirements, a call for proposals was launched in July 2016 [5] in order to provide 
solutions to the genomic information compression and representation problem. The 15 
answers to this call have been discussed in the 116th meeting held in Chengdu in 
October 2016 [6].  
The paper focuses on the proposal presented by a group of organizations and 
companies led by the authors [4]. The contribution responds to the transport 
requirements [7], defining a format for storage and transport of genomic information, 
including aspects like metadata, definition of security mechanisms and application of 
privacy rules. 
3. Results: Privacy and Security in Genomics contributed to MPEG 
In [4], we propose a format (that we call GENIFF, for GENomic Information File 
Format) based on ISOBMFF [8] to support the inclusion of compressed and 
uncompressed genomic information. Moreover, we also provide mechanisms to include 
metadata associated to the information stored inside the format. Metadata elements may 
apply to a study, an individual, partial or complete genomic information, etc.  
Apart from generic metadata describing things like the genetic study done, the 
machine used for generating the genomic information and other kind of metadata 
defined by European Bioinformatics Institute (EBI) [9], we have focused on providing 
placeholders to apply security and privacy to the genomic information. In this way, 
only authorized users will be able to access to the information contained in the file. 
Security and privacy elements may apply to different levels, like the complete study or 
only to specific information, for example, a SAM / BAM file [10] or a Variant Call File 
(VCF) [11]. In this way, we can provide a high level of flexibility. 
3.1. Privacy Provision, Use of XACML to Authorize Access to Genomic Information 
In order to provide privacy when accessing genomic information, we use XACML [12] 
rules. First ideas on how to use XACML where already presented to the MPEG 
Committee in [13] and are reflected in our proposal for representing genomic 
information [4]. We are also using XACML rules to provide privacy protection when 
accessing medical information, as described in [14]. The rules for controlling access to 
genomic information may include, among other, the following information: 
 who is able to access to the genomic information (user roles or individuals); 
 what information can be accessed (the complete file, a chromosome, etc.); 
 when it can be accessed;  
 with which purpose (genetic analysis, anonymized study, etc.); 
 if the data provider has to be informed when information is accessed; 
 which permission is given (viewFile, viewChromosome, etc.). 
The rules can be included inside our file format (GENIFF), or even inside the 
existing formats for genomic information, like SAM or BAM [10].  
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The inclusion of the rules inside the genomic files allows us to extract them and 
authorize access to the file according to the permissions defined in the rules. The 
workflow of operations required to authorize the access to genomic information is 
shown in Figure 1. It works as follows: 
1. A user requests, to a repository, access to some specific genomic information. 
To do so, an access request is sent including, among other, the following 
context information: user or role requesting access, the operation requested, 
the time when the request is done, which information wants to be accessed and 
the level of granularity (i.e. complete file, chromosome, etc.).  
2. The genomic information repository extracts the rule(s) from the requested 
genomic information and asks, to the Authorization point, for user 
authorization according to the rule(s) and the request received. 
3. The authorization result could be Permit, Deny or Not Applicable. 
4. In the case of Permit, the access is permitted, so the requested genomic 
information should be decrypted and given to the user from the repository. 
 
Figure 1. Genomic data authorization flow. 
Figure 2 shows a snippet of an XACML rule giving VIEW permission to a 
physician for the file genomic-file.sam. 
3.2. Encrypting Portions of the Data 
When securing genomic information, one of the preferred strategies is to aggregate 
results of multiple individuals and to only respond to queries concerning the whole 
pool of data. Such queries might be, for example, the frequency of a certain mutation in 
the studied population. This is intended to ensure the privacy at the individual level, 
although this approach was proven to have some flaws [1].  
The result of MPEG’s work has to be a format for genomic information, where the 
encryption of the data is used as a way to enforce the privacy rules. Certain regions of 
the DNA can be considered as safe to make them public, while others require a key to 
decrypt the content. By encrypting those regions, we ensure that the file can be 
transmitted, and the access to the content can vary depending on the access the user 
asks for. The actual policy to decide which regions should be protected is left to the 
user creating the file, but one approach might be, as in [2], encrypting the regions to 
remain private, but also include those allowing inference attempts. 
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The encryption is done on well-defined regions of the DNA, for example for a 
given chromosome, using symmetric encryption. Homomorphic encryption might add 
the benefits to enable secure computations on encrypted content (e.g. [15]); however, 
this encryption methodology appears to be tightly bounded to the intended usage, thus 
limiting broad applicability. Therefore, our proposed format uses symmetric encryption, 
leveraging on the employed codec for better granularity (e.g. BAM’s blocks). 
 
<Rule RuleId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:RuleSAM" Effect="Permit"> 
  <Description> A physician may view the genomic information file for which he or  
    she is the designated primary care physician 
  </Description> 
  <Target> 
    <AnyOf> 
      <AllOf> 
        <!-- Which kind of user: physician --> 
        <Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
          <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
            physician 
          </AttributeValue> 
          <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false" 
            Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:role" AttributeId="role" 
            DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
        </Match> 
        <!-- Which resource --> 
        <Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:regexp-string-match"> 
          <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
            genomic-file.sam 
          </AttributeValue> 
          <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false" 
            Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource" 
            AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" 
            DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
        </Match> 
        <!-- Which action  --> 
        <Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
          <AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
            VIEW 
          </AttributeValue> 
          <AttributeDesignator MustBePresent="false" 
            Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:action"  
            AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
            DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
        </Match> 
      </AllOf> 
    </AnyOf> 
  </Target> 
</Rule> 
Figure 2. XACML rule giving VIEW permission to a SAM file. 
4. Discussion, Conclusions and Future Work 
We have developed software to demonstrate the feasibility of the format and its 
granular access control. We have implemented some policy rules with XACML and 
used real SAM/BAM files to evaluate the encryption of content for supporting the 
access control. The results are satisfactory for the moment. 
Our next step is aligned with the standardization process. Some of the presented 
ideas have been initially accepted for consideration by the MPEG Committee. Now it is 
time to perform some formal tests to check their feasibility. For this purpose, a set of 
experiments has been defined [16] and the results have to be presented for discussion at 
the next MPEG meeting, in January 2017.  
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In particular, we will further analyze and implement the presented approach in 
experiment 4, which will check that the genomic information representation format 
defines the proper tools for allowing selective access to the content for both data 
storage and transfer. In addition, these tools should support access control (privacy and 
security) and high-level metadata applying to different genomic information contained 
in the format. We will particularly focus on providing tools for privacy, security and 
metadata definition inside the genomic information.  
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